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INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION AND STRATEGIC 





We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked 
industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using 
tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing 
countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium 
outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and 
downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive 
upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing 
(downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm 
exporting countries. 
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and suggestions. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Vertical linkages play an important role in international trade, partic-
ularly in markets where ﬁrms (and ultimately consumers) rely on key
intermediate inputs or raw materials that are supplied by dominant ex-
porters in one or a few countries. Trade in natural resources serves
as an obvious example. In a policy context, such cross-border vertical
linkages naturally lead to a conﬂict of interest between exporting and
importing countries. In the present paper, we develop a successive inter-
national oligopoly model,1 where upstream oligopolist ﬁrms in two ex-
porting countries supply a homogenous good to downstream oligopolist
ﬁrms in an importing country, where the end-user market is located. In
this context, we analyse the interaction between vertical and horizontal
rent-shifting. In other words, how the policy makers in the exporting and
importing countries may use taxes (or subsidies) strategically in order
to shift rents vertically, up or down the vertical value-chain, and/or hor-
izontally, between exporting countries. We distinguish the cases where
only one or both of the exporting countries engage in strategic trade
policy.2
We believe that our model structure is suﬃciently generic to ﬁta
variety of diﬀerent industries. However, an interesting — and particularly
ﬁtting — example of such an industry structure is the European market
for natural gas. The ongoing liberalisation of the market — through the
implementation of the so-called Gas Directive3 — means that the market
structure is increasingly taking the shape of a successive oligopoly, with
an oligopoly of upstream gas producers and a downstream oligopoly
1See e.g. Greenhut and Ohta (1979) and Salinger (1988) for standard models of
successive Cournot oligopoly.
2The idea that imperfect competition in international markets may create incen-
tives for strategic trade policy has spurred a rich body of research literature over
the last couple of decades. Seminal contributions to the literature on strategic trade
policy include Dixit (1984), Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman
(1986).
3The original EU Gas Directive from 1998 speciﬁed common rules for the trade,
distribution, supply and storage of natural gas. In 2003, an amendment to the direc-
tive included further measures to be taken in order to liberalise the European gas mar-
ket. Details can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/gas/index_en.htm.
2of gas traders.4 Furthermore, natural gas consumption within the EU
relies heavily on supply from a small number of non-EU gas producing
countries (Norway, Russia and Algeria).5
Although international trade agreements to a certain extent may
limit the availability of traditional trade policy instruments, such as
export subsidies and import tariﬀs, there is arguably a wide range of
feasible policy instruments that may be used for strategic trade pur-
poses. For example, a country may adopt lax environmental policies —
as a substitute for direct subsidies — in order to strengthen the com-
petitive position of domestic ﬁrms vis-á-vis their foreign rivals.6 In our
model, we let the policy instrument be a tax (or subsidy) on production
in the respective countries, which can be given several diﬀerent inter-
pretations.7 In any case, the important feature of the model is that
national policy makers can use tax instruments of one or another kind
to aﬀect equilibrium market prices, and thus the allocation of industry
rents between the countries.8
One of the main purposes of our analysis is to discuss how the degree
of competition in diﬀerent parts of the industry is likely to aﬀect the
policy equilibrium. This has important implications for competition
policy and welfare eﬀects of market liberalisation. Given that policy
4Boots et al. (2004) model the European gas market as a successive Cournot
oligopoly. However, strategic policy issues are not looked into.
5See e.g. Austvik (1997), Radetzki (1999) and Percebois (1999) for detailed de-
scriptive analyses of the European natural gas market.
6Seminal contributions to the literature on ‘strategic environmental policy’ include
Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994) and Kennedy (1994).
7For example, in our model (with no domestic consumption in the exporting
countries), an upstream tax on production is equivalent to an export tax, while a
downstream production tax is equivalent to an import tariﬀ levied on the domestic
ﬁrms. It is also worth noting that a consumption tax would have similar qualitative
eﬀe c t sa sa ni m p o r tt a r i ﬀ.
8In the natural gas example, there is also another policy instrument that may
be used strategically in order to extract foreign rents. A key component in the
process of liberalising the European gas market is the concept of ‘third-party access’
(TPA) to gas piplines and transmission networks, where all players have access to the
transportation systems on equal non-discriminatory conditions. Since the exporting
and importing countries control diﬀerent parts of the transmission network, policy
makers may have incentives to set the regulated access price strategically, thereby
engaging in a regulatory competition game, in order to shift rents up or down the
value-chain. In this case, the access price is a de facto tax instrument.
3makers act strategically, which country will gain or lose from increased
competition in either the upstream or downstream part of the industry?
For example, in the process of liberalising the European natural gas
market, there is a stated desire from the European Union not only to
increase downstream competition, but also to increase competition in
the upstream market by trying to break up the sales monopolies of the
exporting countries.9,10 Although downstream ﬁrms may stand to lose,
this should — in principle — yield a net beneﬁt to the importing countries
through increased supply and lower prices. But will this necessarily be
the case if the governments in the importing and exporting countries
engage in strategic trade policy? And how is the presence of competing
exporting countries likely to aﬀect the results? These are some of the
key questions analysed in the paper.
Let us now sketch some of our main ﬁndings. Policy makers in the ex-
porting countries must balance concerns for vertical rent-shifting (which,
generally, requires a positive tax rate) and horizontal rent-shifting (which
requires a negative tax rate). This trade-oﬀ is mainly determined by the
relative degree of upstream competition in the two exporting countries.
If both upstream policy makers act strategically, we show that positive
upstream tax rates in both exporting countries cannot be part of a pol-
icy equilibrium. The equilibrium downstream tax rate, on the other
hand, is positive if, roughly speaking, the downstream market is more
competitive than the upstream market, and negative otherwise. This
illustrates the conﬂict of interest between the countries: whereas the
policy makers in the exporting countries are concerned about maximis-
ing upstream revenue net of production costs, the government in the
downstream country must balance concerns for rent-extraction from the
9The major gas producer Norway — a non-EU country, but subject to the common
competition legislation in the European Economic Area (EEA) — reluctantly accepted
to dismantle the Norwegian gas sales monopoly (GFU) after threats of legal actions
by the EU Commission (see, e.g., Claes and Fossum, 2002).
10Golombek et al. (1998) use a numerical model of the Western European nat-
ural gas market to analyse supply-side responses to a more liberalised downstream
industry, and ﬁnd that producing countries have an incentive to break up their sales
monopolies. However, strategic trade policy, or any form of tax competition between
countries, is not an issue.
4upstream part of the industry (which requires a positive tax rate) and for
stimulating competition in the downstream part of the industry (which
requires a negative tax rate).
Perhaps our most interesting results are related to the welfare eﬀects
of increased competition in the diﬀerent parts of the vertically linked in-
dustry. If only one of the exporting countries engages in strategic trade
policy, increased (upstream) competition in this country will actually
beneﬁt both exporting countries and harm the importing country in the
trade policy equilibrium. This has powerful implications for upstream
competition policy. By stimulating upstream competition, and instead
use a tax instrument to restrict total supply to the downstream market,
r e n t sa r es h i f t e du pt h ev a l u e - c h a i n ,w h i c hb e n e ﬁts the exporting coun-
tries. A similar result was shown by Cowan (1989) in a structurally sim-
pler model, but under more general demand assumptions.11 In this re-
spect, we extend Cowan’s model by introducing a downstream oligopoly
in the importing country and a second exporting (upstream) country,
both of which inﬂuence policy incentives in non-trivial ways. We show
that the result is robust to the introduction of a second exporting coun-
try, conditional on non-strategic behaviour by the policy maker in this
country. However, if both upstream governments act strategically, and
non-cooperatively, the result is reversed, although increased competition
in both exporting countries might beneﬁtt h e s ec o u n t r i e si ns o m es p e c i a l
cases.
Increased downstream competition, on the other hand, is shown al-
ways to beneﬁt the importing country. However, contrary to the case of
free trade, upstream welfare will be reduced if downstream competition
increases beyond a quite concentrated level. Thus, in the context of our
natural gas example, even if the major non-EU gas producers like Nor-
way and Russia retain control over their domestic competition policies,
liberalisation of the downstream European gas market may aﬀect these
exporting countries negatively.
11In a model with oligopolist ﬁrms in a single exporting country selling directly to
consumers in an importing country, and with an export tax and an import tariﬀ as
the policy instruments, the equivalent result is shown to hold if demand is not too
convex.
5To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only paper that studies
policy competition between exporting and importing countries in suc-
cessive international oligopoly. Our analysis relates closely to several
strands of the international trade literature, though. The idea of using
some form of domestic taxation to extract rents from foreign exporters
with market power was ﬁrst presented by Katrak (1979), and has since
been elaborated on and extended in numerous papers.12 However, a
common feature in these papers is a lack of foreign policy response.13
Our paper also relates to a more recent body of contributions that
explicitly model a vertical industry structure with trade in intermediates
within a context of strategic trade policy.14 However, these analyses
focus either on ﬁn a l - g o o d sc o m p e t i t i o ni nat h i r dm a r k e t—ál aB r a n d e r
and Spencer (1985) — or on domestic trade policy only, which makes
them quite diﬀerent from our study.15
Finally, the present paper makes a contribution to the literature on
the interplay between competition and trade policy. Much of this re-
search focuses on the substitutability of strategic trade and merger poli-
cies, and the question of whether trade liberalisation will induce laxer
competition policies.16 We complement this literature by analysing the
12See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984), Bergstrom (1982), Brander and Dja-
jic (1983), Hillman and Templeman (1985) and Lahiri and Ono (1999). Raimondos-
Møller and Woodland (2000) derive similar results in a perfectly competitive context,
but where the trade policy game is characterised by a sequential structure.
13An important exception is Brander and Spencer (1984), who include foreign
policy in an analysis of optimal domestic tariﬀ policy for extracting rents from a
foreign oligopoly. However, the foreign policy instrument is taken to be the degree
of ‘cartelisation’ only, with the implication that complete cartelisation is the optimal
policy when foreign consumption of the good is negligible. However, by equipping
the foreign government with the power also to tax, the exact opposite conclusion is
reached.
14See, e.g., Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992), Ziss (1997), Bernhofen (1997), Ishikawa
and Lee (1997), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) and Chang and Sugeta (2004).
15Of the aformentioned papers, Ishikawa and Lee (1997) and Ishikawa and Spencer
(1999) are perhaps the most closely related, in the sense that they consider a succes-
sive Cournot oligopoly similar to ours. However, besides the fact that these papers
consider domestic trade policy only, there is a marked diﬀerence from the present
paper in the types of international market structures that are analysed.
16In addition to the aforementioned paper by Cowan, important contributions
include Auquier and Caves (1979), Dixit (1984), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levin-
sohn (2001), Huck and Konrad (2004), De Stefano and Rysman (2004) and Saggi
and Yildiz (2004).
6interaction of diﬀerent policy incentives in vertically linked industries. A
novel ﬁnding is that strategic use of tax policies may increase the conﬂict
of interest, with respect to competition policies, between exporting and
importing countries.
2M o d e l
Consider an industry with two vertically related activities. There are a
number of independent upstream producers of a homogenous good lo-
cated in two exporting countries. We let m1 and m2 be the number of
upstream ﬁrms in countries U1 and U2, respectively. The upstream ﬁrms
are supplying n independent (and identical) downstream distributors in
country D, where the good is consumed.17 We want to portray a situa-
tion where downstream ﬁrms are dependent on key inputs from upstream
suppliers in one or a few countries, where domestic consumption of in-
puts in the exporting countries is typically negligible, compared with
their export volumes. Thus, to simplify and keep the analysis clearly
focused, we assume that there is no consumption of the good in the
exporting countries.18
The ﬁrms compete à la Cournot at both stages of the value-chain.
In line with the received literature on successive Cournot oligopoly, we
assume that each downstream ﬁrm takes the wholesale price (as well as
the outputs of other downstream ﬁr m s )a sg i v e nw h e nc o m m i t t i n gt oa n
output quantity. As noted by Salinger (1988) and others, this amounts
to giving upstream producers a ﬁrst-mover advantage.
Within this context, a role for strategic trade policy is created by
letting the policy makers in both exporting and importing countries use
taxes (or subsidies) strategically, in order to shift rents vertically and/or
horizontally. We consider the following three-stage game:
Stage 1: the governments in exporting and importing countries simul-
17Alternatively, we can think of the upstream activity as the production of a ho-
mogenous intermediate good which is transformed into a homogenous ﬁnal good by
downstream ﬁrms at constant marginal costs.
18In the context of the European natural gas market, this is actually a quite ac-
curate assumption for one of the largest gas producers, Norway, where domestic
consumption of natural gas is practically non-existent.
7taneously and independently commit to their preferred values of
upstream and downstream taxes (subsidies), respectively.
Stage 2: the upstream ﬁrms simultaneously and independently commit
to the quantities supplied to the downstream market.
Stage 3: the downstream ﬁrms simultaneously and independently com-
mit to the quantities supplied to the ﬁnal consumers.
3 Market equilibrium
As usual, the game is solved by backwards induction.
Downstream
The market-clearing retail price is given by
p = a − Q, (1)
where Q :=
Pn
k=1 qk is the total output supplied by downstream dis-
tributors. Denoting the wholesale price by w,t h ep r o ﬁtf u n c t i o no fa





p − w − t
D¢
qk, (2)
where tD is a tax rate set by the government in country D.I n t h e
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the output of each downstream ﬁrm is
qk =
a − w − tD
n +1
,k =1 ,...,n. (3)
Upstream
Aggregating (3) and rearranging, we can derive the inverse demand
function facing the upstream ﬁrms. Let xji denote output by ﬁrm j in
country Ui. The inverse demand function is then deﬁned as











j=1 xji is total output supplied by the upstream
ﬁrms. Assuming constant marginal costs of production, c,p r o ﬁts for an
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where tU
i is the tax rate set by the government in country Ui.19












(m1 + m2 +1 )( n +1 )
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This yields an equilibrium total supply of
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with corresponding wholesale and retail equilibrium prices given by
w =
a − tD +( m1 + m2)c + m1tU
1 + m2tU
2















(m1 + m2 +1 )( n +1 )
. (9)
Note that the structural richness of the model allows for diﬀerent
standard assumptions to appear as special cases. For example, mi →
∞ implies that downstream ﬁrms source their inputs from a perfectly
competitive upstream market in country Ui. In this case, the input
(or wholesale) price is simply given by w = c + tU
i . On the other hand,
n →∞implies that p = w+tD. In this case, our model is equivalent to a
standard trade model with foreign exporters selling directly to consumers
in the importing country, where tD corresponds to an import tariﬀ.
19To ensure a positive supply of the good in equilibrium, we must require that
c<a .
20We use subscript −i to denote the other exporting country than i.
94 Taxation and rent-shifting
Before solving for the policy equilibrium, it is instructive to discuss how
taxation can be used to shift rents both vertically, between diﬀerent
parts of the vertical value-chain, and horizontally, between the exporting
countries.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of vertical rent-shifting, by assuming
that upstream taxation is coordinated between the exporting countries.
The eﬀects of taxation on prices and output follow straightforwardly
from (7)-(9). A higher downstream tax will induce downstream ﬁrms to
reduce their outputs, which causes an increase in the ﬁnal price, p.H o w -
ever, such a tax increase also spills over into the upstream part of the
industry. A downstream output contraction implies that the demand
curve facing the upstream producers shifts inward, causing the equi-
librium wholesale price to decrease. Similarly, higher upstream taxes
leads to a reduction of upstream output, but part of such a tax increase
spills over into the downstream country through a higher wholesale price,
c a u s i n ga l s ot h er e t a i lp r i c et oi n c r e a s e .I ne ﬀect, downstream taxes are
partly paid by upstream ﬁrms, whereas upstream taxes are partly paid
by downstream ﬁrms and consumers. Conversely, a downstream sub-
sidy will partly beneﬁtu p s t r e a mﬁrms, and vice versa. A simultaneous
increase in upstream taxes or an increase in downstream taxes will conse-
quently reduce total output (and thus consumers’ surplus) and proﬁts of
both upstream and downstream ﬁrms. This is conﬁrmed by deriving the
expressions for equilibrium proﬁts. Setting tU
1 = tU
2 = tU, equilibrium










a − c − tD − tU¢2
(m1 + m2 +1 )












a − c − tD − tU¢2
(m1 + m2 +1 )
2 (n +1 )
2 . (11)
However, competition for market shares between the exporting coun-
tries also creates an incentive for horizontal rent-shifting.B y l o w e r i n g
the upstream tax rate tU
i , the government in country Ui can induce the
10domestic ﬁrms to act more aggressively in the Cournot game, thereby
shifting rents from foreign upstream ﬁrms. Thus, for an exogenous down-
stream tax rate, the model mirrors a ‘standard’ third-market model of
strategic trade policy, along the lines of Brander and Spencer (1985).
This can be seen directly from the equilibrium proﬁt expression of an






a − c − tD − tU
i (1 + m−i)+m−itU
−i
¤2
(n +1 )( m1 + m2 +1 )
2 . (12)
A lower tax rate in one exporting country will — all else equal — increase
proﬁts accruing to this country, at the expense of proﬁts for the other
exporting country.
5 Policy equilibria
We make the standard assumption that national policy makers maximise
national welfare, deﬁned as the total surplus accruing to all agents situ-
ated in a given country. The objective functions of the governments in


























where CS = 1
2Q2 is consumers’ surplus.21
We will in the following consider two diﬀerent cases, where either one
or both of the exporting countries act strategically with respect to their
tax policies. We will intermittently refer to U1 and U2 as the ‘domestic’
and ‘foreign’ upstream countries, respectively, and our focus is directed
towards the domestic part of the upstream market. We start out by
considering the case where the foreign government (in country U2)d o e s
21Since we allow for negative tax rates, this deﬁnition of welfare relies on an implicit
assumption that the governments are able to raise funds for subsidy payments in a
non-distortionary manner.
11not act strategically, and set tU
2 =0 . Subsequently, we include both
upstream governments in the policy game.
5.1 Non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government
Setting tU
2 =0 ,t h eﬁrst order-conditions fromt h es i m u l t a n e o u sm a x -








(m1 − m2 − 1)
¡
a − c − tD¢










(m1 + m2)(a − c) − m1tU
1
¤
[n +1− (m1 + m2)]
(m1 + m2)[2(n +1 )+n(m1 + m2)]
. (16)
In order to separate the diﬀerent policy incentives, it is instructive
ﬁrst to discuss the case of a single exporting country, i.e., m2 =0 .F r o m
(15) it is clear that in the case of an upstream monopoly (m1 =1 ), the
optimal upstream tax rate is zero, irrespective of the downstream tax
policy. Otherwise, the equilibrium value of tU
1 is positive. This reﬂects
the terms-of-trade motive for upstream taxation.22 When there are more
than one upstream ﬁrm, private incentives lead to socially excessive out-
put, from the viewpoint of upstream welfare, and the policy maker can
induce outcomes closer to the cartel output by taxing upstream produc-
tion (or exports).
How does the presence of foreign upstream competitors (m2 > 0)
aﬀect policy incentives? Foreign upstream competition introduces a new
dimension to the optimal choice of tU
1 , implying that the government
in U1 must balance two opposing considerations. In addition to the
previous terms-of-trade motive for taxation, there is now a (horizontal)
rent-shifting motive vis-á-vis the foreign competitors. By subsidising
production (or exports), the domestic upstream government can shift
rents from foreign exporters. This eﬀect obviously puts a downward
pressure on the upstream tax rate. The optimal balancing of the two
motives for upstream taxation depends on the relative number of ﬁrms in
22See also Dixit (1984) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
12U1 and U2.F r o m( 1 5 )w es e et h a tt h et e r m s - o f - t r a d em o t i v ed o m i n a t e s
—i m p l y i n gap o s i t i v et a xr a t e—i fm1 >m 2 +1 .
The policy maker in the downstream country must balance two dif-
ferent considerations when framing the optimal policy. On the one hand,
t h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ne x t r a c ts o m eu p s t r e a mr e n t sb yi m p o s i n gap o s i t i v e
downstream tax rate. On the other hand, considerations for eﬃciency
dictate that the government should use a subsidy to stimulate down-
stream competition, thereby increasing consumers’ surplus. The rent-
extraction eﬀect depends on the ability of the downstream government
to aﬀect the wholesale price, which, in turn, requires a certain degree
of upstream market power. Increased competition in the upstream part
of the industry makes the wholesale price less sensitive to changes in
the downstream tax rate, which weakens the rent-extraction motive for
downstream trade policy.23 The eﬃciency motive, on the other hand,
is determined by the degree of downstream competition. The lower the
number of ﬁrms operating in the downstream market, the stronger the
incentives to reduce taxes (or increase subsidies) in order to stimulate
competition. Thus, the optimal balancing of the rent-extraction and ef-
ﬁciency motives depends on the relative number of upstream and down-
stream ﬁrms. From (16) we see that the rent-extraction motive domi-
nates if n+1>m 1 +m2, implying tD > 0,w h e r e a st h eo p p o s i t ei st r u e
for n +1<m 1 + m2.
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(2m2 +1 )[ n +1− (m1 + m2)](a − c)
m1 + n +3 m2 +2 m1n +4 m2n +2 m1m2n +2 m2
2n +1
. (18)
Summarising the above analysis, the policy equilibrium is characterised
as follows:
Proposition 1 With non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government,
23F r o m( 8 )w eh a v et h a t∂w/∂tD = −1/(m1 + m2 +1 ) .
13(i) tU
1 > (<)0if m1 > (<)m2 +1 ,
(ii) tD > (<)0if n +1> (<)m1 + m2.
From (17)-(18) we can also derive the most important comparative
statics result for the equilibrium tax rates:
Proposition 2 With non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government,
(i) ∂tU
1 /∂n < (>)0if m1 > (<)m2 +1 ,
(ii) ∂tU
1 /∂m1 > 0,
(iii) ∂tU
1 /∂m2 < 0,
(iv) ∂tD/∂n > 0,
(v) ∂tD/∂m1 < 0.
The intuition for (ii)-(v) follows more or less directly from previ-
ous analysis and discussion. Increased competition in country U1 in-
creases the terms-of-trade motive for upstream taxation, while the rent-
extraction motive for downstream taxation is reduced. As a result, up-
stream (downstream) taxes increase (decrease) in equilibrium. Stronger
downstream competition, on the other hand, increases downstream taxes
due to a reduction in the eﬃciency motive, while the eﬀect on the up-
stream tax rate is ambiguous. In fact, the equilibrium upstream tax
rate will increase if m1 <m 2+1, which implies that the equilibrium up-
stream tax rate is negative. This is a strategic response to changes in the
downstream tax rate. When tU
1 < 0, export market rivalry is the dom-
inant force in determining domestic upstream tax policy. An increase
in downstream competition implies an increase of the downstream tax
rate, which reduces the wholesale price, and thereby the proﬁtability of
supplying the export market. This reduces the incentives for using up-
stream subsidies to capture downstream market shares, and the optimal
upstream subsidy in U1 is correspondingly reduced.
Finally, part (iii) of the Proposition shows that increased foreign
competition to serve the export market will always provoke a tax re-
duction from the domestic upstream country. The more competitive the
foreign upstream market is, the more eﬀective is the use of tax instru-
ments by the domestic country to inﬂuence the equilibrium shares of
14the export market.24 In other words, the higher is m2 relative to m1,
the stronger is the rent-shifting motive, relative to the terms-of-trade
motive, for taxation in the domestic country. Thus, the optimal policy
response from country U1 to an increase in m2 is to improve the domes-
tic ﬁrms’ competitive position in the export market by reducing the tax
rate, tU
1 .
5.2 Strategic behaviour by both upstream govern-
ments
Let us now consider the case where also the foreign upstream government
acts strategically, and chooses tU
2 to maximise the total surplus accruing
to country U2.T h eﬁrst-order conditions of the policy game deﬁne the
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(m2 − m1 − 1)
¡
a − c − tD + m1tU
1
¢
2m2 (m1 +1 )
, (20)
which illustrate that the aforementioned trade-oﬀ between the terms-of-
trade and the rent-shifting motives for upstream taxation now applies
equally to both upstream countries. Once more, the optimal balancing of
these two considerations is determined by the relative number of ﬁrms
in the two countries. The best-response functions reveal that positive
upstream taxes in both countries cannot be part of any policy equilibrium.
With an equal number of ﬁrms in both countries, the rent-shifting motive
always dominates, implying that the optimal upstream policies entail
subsidies. An increase in the number of ﬁr m si no n eo ft h eu p s t r e a m
countries will strengthen the terms-of-trade motive in this country, but
increase the rent-shifting incentive in the other country, implying that
positive taxes in both countries cannot be an equilibrium.
24This is easily conﬁrmed by using (6) to calculate how tax reductions inﬂuence
relative market shares in equilibrium.
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(m1 + m2)[2(n +1 )+( m1 + m2)n]
,
(21)
reveal that the trade-oﬀ between rent-extraction and market eﬃciency is
similar to the previous case, with the exact same condition for a positive
downstream tax rate as before.




(m1 + m2)(mi − m−i − 1)(n +1 )( a − c)





(m1 + m2 +2 )[ 1+n − (m1 + m2)](a − c)
2(n +1 )+( m1 + m2)[2(2n +1 )+( m1 + m2)n]
. (23)
The above discussion is summarised by the following characterisation of
the policy equilibrium:
Proposition 3 (i) If mi = m−i,t h e ntU
i = tU
−i < 0.
(ii) If mi = m−i +1 ,t h e ntU
−i <t U
i =0 .
(iii) If mi >m −i +1 ,t h e ntU
−i < 0 <t U
i .
Once more, the comparative statics results with respect to equilib-
rium taxes are easily derived from (22)-(23):
Proposition 4 (i) ∂tU
i /∂mi > (<)0if mi < (>)m,w h e r em>m −i+1,
(ii) ∂tU
i /∂m−i < 0,
(iii) ∂tD/∂mi < 0,
(iv) ∂tU
i /∂n < (>)0if mi > (<)m−i +1 ,
(v) ∂tD/∂n > 0.
We see that most of the comparative statics results mirror those of
Proposition 2. The only new result is the upstream tax responses to
increased upstream competition. Starting from a monopoly situation in
country Ui (i.e., mi =1 ), increased competition will induce the govern-
ment in this country to increase taxes, as before. However, increased
competition in country Ui also triggers a tax reduction (or increased
16subsidy) from the competing exporting country, which implies a loss of
market share for country Ui.I f mi gets suﬃciently large, the govern-
ment in Ui is eventually forced to reduce taxes in order to prevent the
domestic ﬁrms being outcompeted by foreign suppliers.
6 Industry concentration and national welfare
How does increased competition in the upstream or downstream part
of the industry aﬀect national welfare when national policy makers act
strategically? Before looking more closely into this question, let us ﬁrst
consider the laissez-faire policy as a benchmark case. With tU
i = tD =0 ,
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Increased upstream competition reduces upstream proﬁts and bene-
ﬁts downstream ﬁrms (through a lower wholesale price) and consumers
(trough a lower retail price). Increased downstream competition, on
the other hand, beneﬁts both countries, in terms of national welfare.
Upstream ﬁrms beneﬁt due to increased demand from the downstream
market. Downstream proﬁts suﬀer, but this is outweighed by an increase
in consumers’ surplus.
Things change, though, if national policy makers use tax instruments
strategically. In line with our previous analysis, we consider ﬁrst the
case where only the government in the domestic exporting country acts
strategically.
176.1 Non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government
Using (17)-(18), equilibrium expressions for social welfare in the export-
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From (26)-(28) we derive the welfare eﬀects of increased competition:
Proposition 5 With non-strategic behaviour by the foreign upstream
government,
(i) ∂WU
1 /∂m1 > 0,
(ii) ∂WD/∂m1 < 0,
(iii) ∂WU
1 /∂n > 0 if m2 =0or n<n,
∂WU
1 /∂n < 0 if m2 > 0 and n>n,w h e r e
n :=
m1 +3 m2 +1
2m2 (m1 + m2 − 1) − 1
(iv) ∂WD/∂n > 0.
The introduction of strategic trade policy leads to a surprising result
with respect to industry concentration in the upstream part of the indus-
try. Contrary to the benchmark case, increased upstream competition in
the domestic country actually beneﬁts the domestic country and harms
the downstream country, in terms of social welfare. If we decompose the
eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nm1,w eﬁnd that domestic upstream ﬁrms lose,
while downstream ﬁrms and consumers beneﬁt, as in the benchmark
case. What happens, though, is that tax revenues are shifted upstream.
18The intuition is related to the optimal tax responses to an increase in
upstream competition. For clarity of discussion, consider ﬁrst the special
case of m2 =0 , which corresponds to either a single exporting country
or international coordination of tax policies across exporting countries.25
From Proposition 2 we know that an increase in the number of upstream
suppliers leads to increased upstream taxes, while downstream taxes are
reduced. As previously argued, stronger upstream competition reduces
the rent-extraction motive for the downstream government, leading to a
lower downstream tax rate. Although total output increases, the possi-
bility of shifting rents downstream is reduced, and downstream welfare
drops as a consequence. Upstream welfare increases for the same rea-
son. Increased upstream competition means that less rents are shifted
downwards in the value-chain, while the domestic upstream government
optimally increases the tax rate to correct for the negative competition
externality.
Perhaps surprisingly, these results are not qualitatively aﬀected by
the presence of foreign upstream competition (i.e., m2 > 0), which, all
else equal, puts a downward pressure on upstream taxes. If m2 > 0,a
higher upstream tax rate in the domestic country implies a loss of market
shares to foreign ﬁrms. Thus, increased competition in U1 clearly beneﬁts
U2,a sc a nb ev e r i ﬁed from (27). Even so, this horizontal rent-shifting
from the domestic to the foreign upstream country is not outweighed
by the vertical rent-shifting from the importing country, implying that
both exporting countries beneﬁt from increased upstream competition.
This result is in sharp contrast to the notion that complete cartelisa-
tion is always beneﬁciary for an exporting country with no domestic con-
sumption of the good.26 The reason is simply that cartelisation has two
opposing eﬀects on upstream welfare. On the one hand, it reduces (or
eliminates) the negative competition externality, which is the intended
eﬀect. On the other hand, though, it increases the amount of rents
available for extraction by downstream policy makers. To the extent
25As mentioned in the Introduction, Cowan (1989) considers a tax policy game in
a model that is equivalent to m2 =0and n →∞in our model.
26See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1984).
19that m1 is a choice variable for the domestic upstream government, it is
better to increase m1 — thereby reducing the scope for rent-extraction —
and instead use the tax instrument indirectly to regulate the upstream
oligopoly. An increase in m1 is optimally accompanied by an increase
in tU
1 , which triggers a reduction in tD. W ec a nt h i n ko ft h i sa st h e
domestic, rather than a foreign, government taxing away the domestic
rents.
What about the welfare eﬀects of increased downstream competi-
tion? As in the laissez-faire benchmark, increased downstream com-
petition beneﬁts the importing country. However, in contrast to the
benchmark, the domestic exporting country might suﬀer. From part
(iii) of the Proposition, we see that this is the case if there is foreign
upstream competition (m2 > 0) and the number of downstream ﬁrms is
above a critical level n ≤ 5.27 This is due to the policy response of the
importing country.28 Higher downstream competition has two opposing
eﬀects on upstream welfare: it increases demand from the downstream
market, which beneﬁts upstream ﬁrms, but it also induces a downstream
tax increase, which has the opposite eﬀect. The total eﬀect on upstream
welfare depends thus on the relative strength of these two eﬀects. If
the domestic exporting country is the single supplier of the good to the
downstream market, the ﬁrst eﬀect always dominates. However, compe-
tition from a second exporting country puts a downward pressure on up-
stream taxes, which increases upstream rents and thus the incentive for
rent-extracting taxation in the importing country.29 Consequently, the
downstream tax response to increased competition in the downstream
market is stronger when the good is supplied from two exporting coun-
tries. If n gets suﬃciently large, this is enough make the overall eﬀect
on upstream welfare negative.
27Since n is monotonically increasing in m1 and m2, it follows that n ≤ 5 for all
permissible values of m1 and m2.
28It can easily be shown that, with non-strategic behaviour by the downstream
government, increased downstream competition will always beneﬁtt h ee x p o r t i n g
countries.
29This can be seen directly from the best-response function of the downstream
policy maker, (16).
206.2 Strategic behaviour by both upstream govern-
ments
To what extent is the relationship between national welfare and industry
concentration dependent on a (lack of) policy response from the foreign
exporting country? If the policy makers in both exporting countries act
strategically, explicit expressions for social welfare in the policy equilib-
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The relationship between industry concentration and welfare in the dif-
ferent parts of the vertical industry is outlined in the ﬁnal Proposition
of the paper:
Proposition 6 (i) ∂WU
i /∂mi < 0,
(ii) ∂WU
i /∂m−i > (<)0if m−i > (<) b m,w h e r eb m<m i.
(iii) ∂WD/∂mi > 0,
(iv) ∂WU
i /∂n > (<)0if n<(>)b n,w h e r e
b n :=




(v) ∂WD/∂n > 0.
From part (i) of the Proposition we see that the previous relation-
ship between competition and welfare in the upstream market is now
reversed. This is due to the policy competition between the export-
ing countries, and closely related to part (ii) of Proposition 4. When
the governments in both exporting countries act strategically, increased
upstream competition in country i triggers a tax reduction in the com-
peting upstream country, with a subsequent reduction in export market
shares, and thus welfare, in country i.
21However, increased competition in one exporting country might in-
crease welfare in the other exporting country, as part (ii) of the Propo-
sition suggests.30 This raises the question of whether the previously
derived positive relationship between upstream competition and welfare
might be restored — even in the case of policy competition between ri-
valing exporting countries — if we consider a simultaneous liberalisation
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2
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where
Φi =2( 4+mi +5 m−i)(n +1 )+( m1 + m2)
2 [2 + n(mi − 3m−i)].
An exporting country will lose from increased competition in its own
country, but gain from increased competition in the rivaling upstream
country. The net gain is determined by the sign of Φi, which is ambigu-
ous. In general, we see that country i will always beneﬁt from increased
competition in both upstream markets if mi is, and remains, suﬃciently
larger than m−i, which suggests that only one country — if any at all —
will stand to gain. This is also generally the case, although numerical
simulations suggest that both countries might beneﬁt if the degree of
concentration is, and remains, at a very high level.31
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We see that mi ≥ m−i is a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for ∂WU
i /∂m−i >
0.
31For the special case of m1 = m2, numerical simulations seem to conﬁrm that
going from one to two ﬁrms in each exporting country increases welfare in both,
whereas an increase from two to three is only beneﬁcial if there is a downstream
monopoly (n =1 ). An increase in the number of ﬁrms beoynd three in each country
is not beneﬁcial for any of the exporting countries.
22Finally, we can observe — from part (iv) of Proposition 6 — that the
potential for exporting countries being adversely aﬀected by a more com-
petitive downstream market is reinforced, compared with the analysis in
the previous sub-section. Now, increased downstream competition will
hurt exporting countries if the number of downstream ﬁrms is larger
than b n ≤ 3. Strategic trade policy by both exporting countries puts an
additional downward pressure on upstream taxes, which reinforces the
incentive for rent-extracting taxation in the importing country, implying
that the downstream tax response to increased downstream competition
is even stronger than in the previous case. This consequently increases
the likelihood that a more competitive downstream market will hurt the
exporting countries.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have presented a comprehensive analysis of tax policy competition
between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked indus-
tries, using a model of successive international Cournot oligopoly, with
a particular emphasis on how the degree of concentration in the dif-
ferent parts of the industry aﬀects the distribution of rents among the
countries. Here we will not recapitulate all results of the paper, but
rather provide some ﬁnal thoughts and elaborations on a couple of our
main ﬁndings regarding the welfare eﬀects of increased competition in
the industry.
Elaborating on and extending a similar result in the previous lit-
erature, we have shown that a more competitive upstream market can
beneﬁt an exporting (upstream) country, while hurting the importing
(downstream) country. In our model, this result holds even in the case of
supply from a second exporting country, providing that the government
in this country acts non-strategically. When both upstream governments
engage in strategic trade policy, though, the result is generally reversed,
although increased competition in both upstream countries might ben-
eﬁt both exporting countries in a few special cases. If the exporting
countries were able perfectly to collude on their tax policies, though, we
would eﬀectually be back in the equilibrium where only one exporting
23country acts strategically. This has some interesting implications with
respect to, for example, the optimal strategy of an international cartel
l i k eO P E C .T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tat a xr e s p o n s ef r o mi m p o r t i n gc o u n -
t r i e sc a nb es p u r r e d ,i tm i g h tb em o r ei m p o r t a n t( i . e . ,p r o ﬁtable) for
the OPEC countries to coordinate their tax policies, rather than their
export volumes.
We also ﬁnd that a more competitive downstream industry may in
fact hurt exporting countries when policy makers act strategically. In
our particular model, in the case of strategic behaviour by all involved
countries, this will be always happen whenever the number of domes-
tic ﬁrms exceeds three. This result suggests that the use of strategic
trade policy is likely to increase the conﬂict of interest, with respect to
competition policies, between exporting and importing countries. In the
case referred to above, the conﬂict of interest is close to complete: the
importing country would like to stimulate competition in all parts of
the industry, whereas the exporting countries have generally the exact
opposite interests.
Finally, we should emphasise that, in order to increase the richness of
our analysis, relative to the received literature, generality of functional
forms has to a certain extent been sacriﬁced to the beneﬁto fh i g h e r
structural generality. Thus, we cannot claim a high degree of generality
for all of our results. We do, however, believe that the main mechanisms
at work apply to a wider class of demand and cost functions than the
linear speciﬁcations. Besides, in the cases where opposing forces pro-
duce ambiguous results, these will obviously persist under more general
demand and cost assumptions.
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